

## Some Aspects of D. Uznadze's Concept of Objectification

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### *Abstract*

*When D. Uznadze's Theory of Set is viewed from the perspective of formation stages, the Theory of Set, per se, and objectification theory are distinguished from each other. In general, theory of objectification aims to explain participation of conscious processes in the formation and functioning of unconscious set and the role of unconscious set in the formation and functioning of conscious processes. Such a perspective implies that the theory of unconscious set and the theory of objectification are two indispensable constituents of an integrate, general psychological Theory of Set. The given article attempts to prove once again the appropriacy of like approach and further elaborate on objectification as a main category of Theory of Set.*

***Key words: set, objectification, behavior, adaptation.***

It is believed that the theory of objectification is an indispensable part of D. Uznadze's Theory of Set (Шерозия, 1978); (Прангишвили, 1978); (ნადორაშვილი, 1985). It is true that 'Uznadze's theory did not come out of nothing' (ომედაძე, 2013) and relates to many other theories. In this article objectification will be considered in the context of D. Uznadze's Theory of Set and the research conducted within Uznadze's school of psychology. The article will be selective in terms of the works used for the purpose of analysis.

There are many definitions of the concept of *object*, but none of them is complete or comprehensive enough (Bradley Rettler, Andrew M. Bailey, 2017). The definition according to which the object is something that opposes the subject, his/her consciousness as part of reality is contextually close to the present text (ИВИН, 2004). This implies that the object

interacts with the subject and its separation from environment is determined by subject's activity. 'Object is anything that can be perceived, imagined, visualized or considered; the object can be real, unreal or even hallucinatory' (Ibid.). Only that part of environment/reality can be regarded as object which is related to the subject (Лекторский, 2001).

Following D. Uznadze, A. Sherozia legitimately emphasized the following: to ensure purposefulness of behavior the subject and the object need to be interrelated within set. 'Transition of the object into its subjective form, into the form of this or that ideal image which directly merges with the given need and, thanks to it, enters the structure of a specific activity, takes place within the framework of set formation process' (Шерозия, 1978). Here we need to explain the place of 'merger' and the precondition for 'entering the structure of activity'. 'Situation', which, according to Uznadze, is considered to be one of the factors of set could be defined as part of the environmental objects that are important for the subject, the valence of which is determined not only by their relatedness to the subject's needs, but, also their relationship with situational and/or fixed mental formations <sup>1</sup>. Singling out situation, as its part, from the entire environment or 'restricting' environment to situation, is a result of the subject's reflective activity. It is important that when the subject assigns valence to the object, a channel is immediately formed through which the object enters the psyche, connects to and transforms the mental formations which initially assigned valence to the object. (This could be the initial structuring of set formed solely under the influence of the subjective factor, which undergoes gradual differentiation and renovation and from that renovated perspective repeatedly reflects the situation which might cause changes in the valence of the given object). In this context we need to differentiate reflection as the acquisition of information from reflection as mental changes and modifications evoked

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<sup>1</sup> Social values which, in a certain sense, have valence and potential to evoke activity independently from individuals, is a separate issue (ნადარეიშვილი, ფიქსირებული და სიტუაციური დისპოზიციური ფსიქიკური წარმონაქმნების ურთიერთმიმართება, 2020).

under the influence of acquired information. The object reflected in the psyche initially exists as somewhat separate from the subject or in the form opposing the subject. As a result of relating to other factors of set within the set, as a result of permanent interaction of the subjective and the objective within the composition of set and along with their merger and loss of independent existence, the above-mentioned separateness is replaced with the stage of undividable wholeness which indicates the formation of set. It is the set through which (as a hypothetic mediator) individual factors (including the objective factor) 'enter the structure of a specific activity'.

The smooth formation of set described above can take place when the factors of set are 'complete'<sup>2</sup>, which means that they are adequate to evoke set-driven modification of the psyche (to form a differentiated set) and ensure purposeful behavior<sup>3</sup>. The existence of just these quantitative characteristics of factors is required by the first level of set of mental activity which ensures the evocation and regulation of 'impulsive' behavior. Such an understanding of impulsivity is acceptable if by impulsivity we mean the nonexistence of the subject's conscious (e.g. thinking or volitional resources) participation. Otherwise, it would mean that the behavior typical of the second /conscious level of mental activity is evoked without impulses.

Given the above-said, it might be plausible to use 'impulsivity' not only in relation to behavior, but, also, in relation to set. Set is 'impulsive' when the impulses required for its formation are provided by complete factors (impulsivity understood as immediacy), when set is formed without any difficulty, without the use of additional mental resources, only on the basis of unconscious resources, and the impulses needed by behavior are easily provided by set. In other words, the primary impulse goes through (penetrates) all the stages easily, without passing the interim level (consciousness). The specificity of the second level of

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<sup>2</sup> By completeness D. Uznadze means 'real givenness' of factors which should be understood as (a) maximally informative nature of the objective factors which is the representer of the environment, and (b) the level of the actuality of the subjective factor/need adequate to evoke enough set.

<sup>3</sup> The issues related to other form of behavior (goal-directed searching activity) are discussed in (ნადარეიშვილი, განწყობა და მოლოდინი, 1993).

mental activity (necessity of its operation) is that set cannot be formed if incomplete factors provide inadequate impulses. Therefore, if set cannot be formed it cannot provide impulses, i.e. evoke purposeful behavior.<sup>4</sup>

The above means that the 'objective factor' not only implies reality and environment, but it also implies that environment is already the object for the subject, though in a partially analyzed form. 'The object is still exposed to the subject at the level of sensations, but to a certain extent, in a latent or partially analyzed form. Further repeated adequate reflection of the object through thinking implies the transformation of the initial data of cognition' (Ильичёв, 1983). The object given in the above form needs further elaboration in terms of increased clarity and specification so that it becomes a fully developed constituent of set (in terms of increased specification and clarity) and provides a basis for the formation of 'differentiated' (rather than 'diffuse') situational set adequate for the performance of purposeful behavior.

In the version presented above impossibility of formation of set or performance of behavior are regarded in terms of the problems related to the factors<sup>5</sup>. Below we touch upon the relationship between the solution of the given problem and objectification.

As said above, behavioral problems may arise from the impossibility to form an integrate set (situational set) due to inadequacy of the factors (the factors are not adequately presented or reflected or are inconsistent with each other). The problem could also arise when fixed set loses its functionality (the only possibility considered by Uznadze), i.e. the loss of functionality by already integrate formation (e.g., inability to evoke and regulate automatic behavior). Solution of both problems will be considered below from the perspective of Uznadze's concept of 'objectification'.

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<sup>4</sup> Another issue is the potential of 'intensified' or artificial factors created by thinking, volition and motivation, involved in the second level of mental activity, to supply set with the needed impulses.

<sup>5</sup> The given article concerns the issues related to the objective factor and the role of cognitive functions in the solution of relevant problems.

It is advisable to clarify that the function of objectification is to form an object having the givenness/shape useful for further, additional reflection of the initial material obtained through unconscious/set-driven reflection.

We could consider several general definitions of objectification: 1) Freeing reflection of some object from subjectivity, emotionally loaded attitude; 2) Separating from something (for example, separating the subject from the object) and gaining independent existence; 3) 'Gaining external, objective existence by something subjective, mental' (Касавин, 2009), its embodiment. In our opinion, the term 'objectification' is more relevant for interpretation, which is a separate issue; 4) 'The process of thinking through which sensations that arise as subjective conditions, transform into object perception.' (Ивин, 2004).

To analyze 'objectification' as understood in Uznadze's works, we will focus on arbitrarily isolated constituents and stages.

'Objectification is a behavioral act ...' (უზნაძე, განწყობის ფსიქოლოგია, 2004), 'The individual's fundamental ability to stop, terminate activity, pause...' (Ibid.). To be more specific, here we mean stopping a behavior since Uznadze speaks about singling out a link from the 'chain' of hindered behavior (another kind of 'pausing'/stopping, relevant to objectification, will be discussed below). In relation to the named 'ability', different forms of pausing need to be singled out: a) Due to inadequacy of factors (insufficient reflection) set cannot ensure purposeful progression of behavior. In this case pausing is a result of inconsistency with adaptive tasks, objective circumstances rather than the subject's activity; b) Pausing is a product of inconsistency between sets. In general terms it is also the subject's activity, the use of the subject's resources (the existing fixed set blocks/terminates the formation of situational set, realization of set and behavior), but conscious involvement /activity, i.e. the realization of ability, is not salient in this case, either; c) Through the operation of thinking and willpower, the subject opposes a new, intentionally formed set, to the current set and stops it by the newly formed set. We assume that only the latter could be

understood as the exercise of ability or the activity which is conscious and specific of human being.

In parallel to different forms of pausing, it is necessary to discuss the 'problems' which cause pausing and its versions and reasons. For this purpose it would be advisable to consider the forms of objectification as suggested by Sh. Nadirashvili (ნადირაშვილი, 1985, გვ. 80). It seems possible to further differentiate objectification forms of 'social influence' and 'Self' as presented by Sh. Nadirashvili and interpret their relationship if we assume that certain dimensions of Self, i.e. norms and values internalized from culture and social environment are reflected in fixed mental formations which is their form of existence (ნადარეიშვილი, ფიქსირებული და სიტუაციური დისპოზიციური ფსიქიკური წარმონაქმნების ურთიერთმიმართება, 2020). On the other hand, the objectification of Self and 'social influence' are a product of joint action of regulatory and integrative forms or are the versions of direct or indirect impact of social influence. It seems plausible that it is just the objectification of Self which should be considered most relevant to the above-mentioned 'pausing' specific of human being, because it actually has the nature of the volitional act of the personality.

We will discuss below the causes of 'objectification of an object' <sup>6</sup> and the constituents of the objectification process of the behavior performed at the first level of mental activity (used and modified ideas of the following authors: D. Uznadze, Sh. Nadirashvili, A. Sherozia (Шерозия, 1978, გვ. 42).

1) Hindrance of behavior, problems with the realization of set and behavior, which, in its turn, is caused by the problem related to the factor of set which is deficiency of complete and objective information; 2) Emergence of negative emotion and its signaling function (see below); 3) 'Noticing' the problem which has evoked emotion (D. Uznadze); 4) Stopping and

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<sup>6</sup> 'Self' objectification is a different case where objectification could have the following reasons: a) inconsistency between fixed set formations and situational set, or b) inconsistency between 'motivating, cardinal' fixed formations and 'stylistic, peripheral' fixed formations.

‘bringing into one point’ (D. Uznadze), involuntary directedness of attention at what has caused the problem; 5) Singling out the entity that has caused the problem from the flow/‘chain’ of events; 6) Making the object that has caused the problem into an independent object; 7) Repeated directedness of set-driven reflection at the object. As we see from what has been said above, there are no signs of the involvement of consciousness in the described stages (differently from the idea that objectification implies the participation of consciousness (see A. Sherozia). As for the involvement of consciousness, here we need to consider the next steps in the entire process which do not involve objectification (if we try to adhere to the framework of D. Uznadze’s theory), but rather the use of objectification results, i.e. concentration on objectified givenness (any kind of attention) and directing it at cognitive functions to obtain additional information. By using these functions, it becomes possible to supplement the information obtained through insufficient set- driven reflection, obtain and process additional information (e.g., thinking as a specific cognitive function among other things provides information on causality and interrelationship of events, which cannot be obtained through set-driven reflection). It is, actually, information about future, whereas other specific cognitive functions are limited to present givenness. For a more elaborate view on the relationship between D. Uznadze’s ‘objectification’ and J. Piaget’s ‘centration’ and ‘decentration’ (Piaget, 1960) see (ნადარეიშვილი, ჟ. პიაჟეს და დ. უზნაძის რამდენიმე ცნების ურთიერთმიმართება, 2022). Note that the meaning and purpose of ‘decentration’ is the provision of maximum, comprehensive and objective information.

In the second context, the essential version of ‘pausing’ is the following: The real meaning of the concept (i.e. *concept of objectification*) (უზნაძე, განწყობის ფსიქოლოგია, 2004, გვ. 283) ‘the moment of pausing or stopping at something’, the unstoppable life flow is ‘continuous switching from the realization of one set to another...’ - writes D. Uznadze. ‘In some cases the subject stops, pauses at an individual set and by doing

so terminates the attempt of its realization.’ (Ibid. 282). In this case, Uznadze, obviously, goes to the following issue: the set chain and the way it is broken into pieces. The question is how the subject manages to stop at a condition or an unconscious formation which has not yet become an object. This may be the reason for the parallel use of behavioral chain and the chain of sets. In the latter case we can assume that an unsuccessful behavior, its hindrance, evokes an emotion<sup>7,8</sup> a negative emotion which serves as a signal. It highlights the givenness/fragment which caused the problem, attracts attention (voluntary and involuntary attention will be discussed in a separate work) and requires pausing at the negative, at what caused the problem. This means that at the given stage the reason for stopping is the problem rather than directedness at the problem which starts with ‘bringing into one point’ and is followed by directing oneself at the problem and involvement of cognitive processes. Another point for discussion is a negative emotional tone caused by set itself rather than the objective givenness that has caused the impediment which could be related to a) inconsistency between an individual set and other sets, or b) inconsistency between the components of set, which results in the impediment of the realization of set and experiencing negative affect. Like interpretation unifies, interrelates and clarifies the following: ‘Objectification is solely pausing at any of our set conditions, at any piece of our experience’ (უზნაძე, განწყობის ფსიქოლოგია, 2004, გვ. 294). ‘It is repeated experience of something which might become an object of our attention’, adds Uznadze. In this case Uznadze uses the term ‘attention’ synonymously with concentration. The subject stops, but does not terminate activity ‘to force oneself and re-experience what she/he has paused at...’ (Ibid.). According to Uznadze, we have to differentiate at least the following stages in the process: emergence of problem, pausing, concentration on the problem, re-experiencing and making it into an

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<sup>7</sup>Any feeling is related to activity: it is the experience of impediment of activity or its smooth progression’ (უზნაძე, შენიშვნების რეგული, 1988, გვ. 53).

<sup>8</sup> Objectification cannot be reduced to the emergence of hindrance or pausing of behavior. Pausing is the stage preceding objectification and is caused by problem. In this case the problem results from inconsistency between the current behavior and the desirable purposeful behavior or the feeling that the current behavior is not promising and adaptation objective is possibly unachievable (this version of the occurrence of emotion is also proposed by Uznadze), which is reflected by the emotion signaling this message.



object. The latter is understood as follows: ‘When bringing something into one point the subject performs just this kind of pausing at what she/he has just experienced. [...] As if we experience something which is given, experience reality as something existing outside us, as something objective ... {i.e.} we perform the objectification act which enables us to experience something as given, as an object’ (ibid.).

When discussing this issue we have to remember that information about the object (existing in the form of an ideal subjective image) already exists in the set thanks to the set-driven ‘initial reflection’ (Uznadze). Set is a new integrate entity unreducible to its components, a functional structure. Due to this, when a problem arises, behavior is hindered (e.g., (a) behavioral chain or (b) chain of sets is broken<sup>9</sup>, or (c) an individual set loses functionality, it becomes difficult or impossible to find and identify within the whole formation the individual constituent directly responsible for the problem. With the above taken into consideration, it is necessary to ‘dismantle’ the set during objectification and separate its constituents from each other to correct the specific deficient constituent and fix the problem. Apart from the repeated set-driven reflection it could be a) additional involvement of cognitive processes to ensure further reflection of the objective factor in order to obtain additional information; b) volitional and motivational effort directed at the improvement of the subjective factor as a result of which further differentiation and structuring of the set takes place<sup>10</sup>. Objectification is pausing at ‘set - driven condition’ due to insufficient differentiation of set (inability to regulate behavior), its decomposition and further elaboration of the factor which caused the problem. We can assume that objectification is the process contrary to the formation of set (organizing the subjective and the objective into an integrate whole) which implies ‘dismantling’ of set into its constituents

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<sup>9</sup> It is the case when the realization of a behavior or set is a precondition for the actualization of the next set as the previous set provides the factor for the following. In other words, the function of ‘serving behaviors’ is to provide material to ‘consuming behaviors’ (Uznadze).

<sup>10</sup> This implies complete and adequate givenness of the factors – constituents necessary for the formation of situational set and the maintenance of their interrelationship (structured character) to ensure integrity and individuality (differentiation from other possible conditions) of set. In the case of fixed set optimal structuring implies the presence of all components and their compatibility.

the final objective of which is further structuring and differentiation of set through elaboration and improvement of its factors.

When talking about ‘decomposition’ of an unconscious mental formation, it would be advisable to consider the following: There are many definitions of ‘unconscious’, depending on the theoretical approach and the author’s theoretical perspective. According to English, H. B., & English, A. C. there are at least 39 meanings of the term (Craighead, 2004). According to the prevalent definition of ‘unconscious’, it is ‘the part of the mind you are not aware of’ (Matsumoto, 2009). Find below several definitions of the unconscious, which are contextually closer to the research issue: ‘Inseparability of the reality image from the subject’s attitude towards this image is revealed in a specificity of the unconscious which is its insensitivity to inconsistencies and transtemporal nature...’ (Асмолов, 1989); ‘A form of mental reflection in which the reality image and the subject’s attitude towards this image are not the object of special reflection since they represent and form an undividable whole’ (Карпенко, 1998). The above mentioned undifferentiated wholeness of the image and the attitude toward this image is caused by set-driven reflection which is the ‘subjective aspect of reality reflection’ understood as follows: Not everything is reflected, but only what is related to the subject’s actual need and/or to the situational set that is at the initial stage of formation and/or to reactualized fixed set. ‘The unconscious is different from the conscious in that the reality reflected by it merges with the subject’s experience, his/her attitude towards the world, due to which, the actions unconsciously performed by the subject cannot be controlled by any means; neither the results of these actions can be evaluated’ (ibid.). ‘Along with the unconscious factors that elicit behavior (unconscious motives and sets)’ (Грицанов, 1999), one of the classes of unconscious manifestations is thought to belong to ‘operational sets’<sup>11</sup> and automatized behavioral stereotypes... which serve as a basis for automatized and unintended {in our case ‘impulsive’, V.N } behaviors and which can be made conscious if the subject unexpectedly encounters an obstacle while performing an automatized activity.’

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<sup>11</sup> Mainly fixed sets.

(Карпенко, 1998). It is clear that the described situation is similar to the case of breaking the Uznadze 'chain'.

There is another issue to consider: If during objectification an object is separated from the unconscious set-driven wholeness, this means that the givenness already reflected in the set, the deficiency of which caused the problem, is repeatedly reflected (subjective image). Stemming from this, repeated reflection of this givenness will only insignificantly improve this kind of deficiency. In addition, initial givenness could be reflected in an assimilative way (subjective interpretation) and an attempt could be made to reuse these data in order to put set into operation again, which will not be productive in terms of adaptation. Therefore, objectification of the givenness presented in set and its repeated reflection is not often sufficient for adaptation purposes because of not being informative enough. In the cases described above the problem that continues to exist provokes further actions so that the subject reflects the reality again to obtain reliable and adequate information. This does not mean that relatively accurate and specified previous givenness (for example, general dimensions of the searched object) obtained through objectification is useless. This kind of givenness provides a kind of orientation and indicates what needs to be searched for and repeatedly reflected in the environment and in what direction. If the above is translated into the terminology of Theory of Set this would mean that (a) need to solve the problem (according to Uznadze 'theoretical need') provides the 'subjective factor' of set, whereas (b) general information obtained through objectification provides the model of searched object or the ideal 'objective factor'. The set formed on the basis of like factors already serves as a basis for the operation of conscious cognitive functions which serve the following purpose: to obtain the factor useful for the renovation of set and formation of a new set.

We can state that set is 'dismantled' to reconstruct what has been experienced, correct the gaps and further differentiate the factor which is achievable by obtaining the material /factor useful for the formation of an adequate set. At the unconscious level of set-driven regulation (within certain limits, e.g., within the limits of 'latitude of assimilation') the above

functions are served by assimilation and contrast<sup>12</sup>. In case these are deficient (it is possible to form set with the use of assimilated givenness but it cannot ensure purposeful behavior), involvement of consciousness ensures the use of additional resources<sup>13</sup>, which proves the well-known statement on the synergic operation of conscious and unconscious regulation.

### Conclusion

1) Behavioral problem, and, consequently, objectification need can be caused not only by (a) loss of functionality of already existing integrate mental formation (fixed set), but also by (b) inability to form set-driven integrate mental formation (situational set) due to the deficiency of factors. In such a case, objectification (understood as separation of the subject and the object) implies (a) subject – object separation when these two already exist within the fixed mental formation and by the moment of repeated actualization of the fixed set, the factors have already become deficient; (b) transformation of the deficient problem factor into the object during formation of situational set. In both cases, it is productive to use D. Uznadze's term 'objectification' to explain behavioral problem and, also, describe the ways of problem solution;

2) During objectification we deal with the process which is reverse of the formation of set as a whole, i.e. decomposition of the structural integrity of set into its constituents and experiencing each constituent/factor as an independent object. The applicability of the above reasoning to both forms of set is proved by following: dismantling/breaking of 'chain' (whether in the case of behavioral chain or the chain of interrelated sets) which is discussed by Uznadze in the context of impulsive behavior and only in relation to its underlying fixed set, takes place also in the case of situational set because impulsive behavior is performed not only on the basis of fixed set, but also on the basis of situational set. In the latter case we deal

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<sup>12</sup> While elaborating on these issues it would be advisable to consider J. Piaget's accommodation version of objectification and Sh. Nadirashvili's adaptive value of contrast illusion.

<sup>13</sup>The same is, actually, stated by A. Prangishvili (Прангишвили, 1978) and A. Sherozia (Шерозия, 1978, стр. 92) even though these authors do not emphasize the deficiency of the factor as the reason of objectification.

with the objectification related to individual/separate situational set rather than the chain described above, and 'decomposition' could only mean the decomposition of the situational set with initial structure into its constituents/factors and objectification of these factors;

3) If we take into consideration D. Uznadze's viewpoint according to which the human psyche (and, correspondingly, set) always implies the participation of consciousness, then we should speak about the domain of set (first level of mental activity), where the unconscious prevails, but consciousness is present to a lesser extent and 'the level of objectification' (second, conscious level of mental activity) where is observed increased involvement of consciousness. Stemming from the above, it would be plausible if instead of understanding objectification as a bridge or a switcher between the separate conscious and unconscious spheres (which is in line with the well-known viewpoints according to which during the emergence of adaptation problem a leap is made from unconscious to conscious regulation), it is understood as the process of movement on a single mental continuum from low level of consciousness to a higher level and as its instrument. During the process sharp transitions might take place when, at a certain stage of movement, information about the object obtained through an increased participation of consciousness unifies into a salient, separate object, and represented in this way becomes experientially existent and accessible;

4) Assignment of a valence to the object by the subject (primary directedness at the object) creates a two-way permanent channel through which the object enters the psyche and relates to the mental formation (need, set), which has been assigned the valence and ensures their future modification;

5) An important question is how it is possible to define the givenness which needs to be objectified. Impossibility of the realization of set and unsuccessful behavior, their impediment and the occurrence of tension result in negative emotions which serve a 'signaling' function for 'noticing' the problem causing unpleasant emotions. This makes the givenness/fragment which caused the problem salient and involuntarily attracts attention (in D. Uznadze's works the relationship between objectification and attention requires

serious consideration). The above could answer the question *what* caused the problem, but further objectification is needed to answer the question *why* this givenness became problematic. The same approach could be used to describe the function of positive emotions accompanying successful behavior;

6) As said above, objectification is a precondition for the improvement of the factors of set. Consequently, it serves the differentiation of set to ensure the purposefulness of behavior, i.e. successful adaptation. It should be taken into consideration that all the operations related to objectification are performed through repeated reflection and processing of information already reflected by set, which means that initial subjective information undergoes additional reflection (in other words, an interaction between mental and mental takes place). It is clearly a step forward compared to initial gaps, but this does not mean that the reality which has been partially reflected due to the specificity of set-driven reflection (e.g., Piaget's 'centration' caused by the influence of set) will be now represented in a complete form. But the thing is that adaptation problems arose not only because the information obtained through set-driven reflection was not fully used, but also because set-driven reflection was not able to reflect or adequately reflect the part of reality which was necessary for purposeful behavior (interrelationship between objectification, centration and decentration is discussed in (ნადარეიშვილი, ჟ. პიაჟეს და დ. უზნაძის რამდენიმე ცნების ურთიერთმიმართება, 2022).(???????));

7) When an activity related problem arises, subsequent, repeated set-driven reflection is not enough. It becomes necessary to perform reflection by new set. The latter, based on the already existing, even problematic set, will involve a larger share of objectivity and stimulate reflection through conscious cognitive processes. The new 'set of theoretical behavior' serves cognitive purposes. This implies repeated and multi-aspect reflection of the reality object (interaction of mental and non-mental) which results in the creation of a renewed and specified object (its mental representation) on the basis of relatively objective and minimally subjective (centered) information;

8) Stemming from the above we could differentiate the following versions of objectification: a) Transformation of a problematic givenness, already existing at the level of set, into an object and directing at it set-driven unconscious corrective mechanisms; b) Transformation of a problematic givenness, already reflected at the level of set, into an object and its detailed repeated reflection with the involvement of consciousness; further correction and differentiation of factors and already existing set; c) Repeated, additional reflection of reality with the use of conscious resources, searching and making salient the givenness relevant to the adaptation related task, its transformation into an object, concentration on it and obtaining maximum information needed for adaptation which will be used for the formation on its basis of a new set. These versions can be related to assimilation and accommodation as defined by Piaget;

9) It is important for D. Uznadze's theory that when discussing the synergy of conscious and unconscious resources for adaptation purposes to consider (a) unconscious nature of set formation, and, at the same time (b) in certain instances, the possibility of providing the factors useful (able to evoke mental modification) for the formation of set with the participation of conscious processes while organizing the factors into a set is maintained as an unconscious process.

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